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Abstract
Perceptual decisions can be made when sensory input affords an inference about what generated that input. Here, we
report findings from two independent perceptual experiments conducted during functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) with a sparse event-related design. The first experiment, in the visual modality, involved forced-choice discrimination
of coherence in random dot kinematograms that contained either subliminal or periliminal motion coherence. The second
experiment, in the auditory domain, involved free response detection of (non-semantic) near-threshold acoustic stimuli. We
analysed fluctuations in ongoing neural activity, as indexed by fMRI, and found that neuronal activity in sensory areas
(extrastriate visual and early auditory cortex) biases perceptual decisions towards correct inference and not towards a
specific percept. Hits (detection of near-threshold stimuli) were preceded by significantly higher activity than both misses of
identical stimuli or false alarms, in which percepts arise in the absence of appropriate sensory input. In accord with
predictive coding models and the free-energy principle, this observation suggests that cortical activity in sensory brain areas
reflects the precision of prediction errors and not just the sensory evidence or prediction errors per se.
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Introduction
The notion that perception involves inference dates back for
centuries and has been refined using mathematical models,
grounded mostly in a Bayesian framework [1]. Yet, contemporary
models of perceptual decisions differ in terms of neuronal
implementation, and the neurophysiological evidence garnered
in their support [2,3]. In some accounts, cortical activity reflects
sensory evidence that is accumulated to a critical level to yield a
perceptual decision. This family of diffusion or race models can be
regarded as dynamic extensions of signal detection theory [4]. In
these models, the implicit neuronal code is a log-probability or
likelihood-ratio code. In other hierarchical models, cortical activity
encodes top-down predictions and bottom-up prediction error
[5,6]. The error signal is accumulated and used to optimise
predictions and suppress prediction error or free-energy. In this
case, inference rests on predictions that serve to explain away the
difference between predicted and incoming sensory information.
Both views are supported by studies of evoked cortical responses
during perceptual decisions [7,8,9]. However, it is difficult to say
which model better explains empirical observations, because both
can be formulated to give similar predictions. Recently, it has been
shown that ongoing cortical activity, prior to sensory stimulation,
can predict subsequent perceptual decisions [10,11,12,13]. As
ongoing activity fluctuates between trials, so does the perception of
identical stimuli. Critically, the two theoretical accounts make
qualitatively different predictions about the relationship between
ongoing activity and perception. Put simply, under evidence
accumulation models, activity increases with the evidence for a
stimulus, whereas under predictive coding it reflects the precision
of the prediction error [14]. Therefore, in evidence accumulation
models, high ongoing activity will bias inference to detection with
(true hits) or without (false alarms) an appropriate stimulus.
Conversely, under predictive coding, ongoing activity levels in
sensory cortex reflect the precision (inverse variance) of sensory
noise. When sensory noise is low prediction errors are amplified. If
sensory noise is high, this induces self-inhibition among units
coding prediction error and leads to a relative increase in the
influence of top-down predictions [14]. In this setting, false alarms
are emitted when the precision is too low to counter top-down
predictions for which there is no sensory evidence.
In short, accumulation models suggest high ongoing activity will
biastowardsstimulusdetection(truehitsorfalsealarms).Conversely,
the predictive coding or free-energy formulation suggests that high
ongoing activity (i.e., precise prediction errors) will bias towards
correct inference (hits or correct rejections). This means we can
adjudicate between the two models by examining pre-stimulus
activity for hits, correct rejections, false alarms and misses.
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related to false alarms in two perceptual paradigms. Findings from
both experiments have been reported previously but only with
respect to hits and misses (where we had greater trial numbers)
[12,13]. However, these two conditions alone do not permit any
conclusion regarding the nature of the signal, prediction error or
sensory evidence. We therefore conducted a new analysis that
included those subjects in the two experiments with a sufficient
number of false alarms for statistical analysis. We obtained small
but significant effects that were consistent across both experiments
and that suggest that neural activity in sensory areas codes the
precision of prediction error.
Results
The first experiment involved detecting motion coherence in
random dot kinematograms with coherent motion at threshold
(periliminal) in most trials and above or below threshold (supra-
and subliminal) in a smaller number of trials [12]. We measured
cortical activity, prior to evoked responses (grey ellipse in Fig. 1), in
the human visual motion complex V5/hMT+. According to
accumulation models we should observe pre-stimulus activity
levels for: hits and false alarms . misses and correct rejections.
And, according to predictive coding: correct rejections and hits .
misses and false alarms. Our empirical observations confirmed the
latter (Fig. 1).
The greatest difference in pre-stimulus activity was between the
correct rejections and false alarms (solid blue and red lines,
respectively). This is clear evidence that pre-stimulus activity
reflects the precision (predictive coding) of the subsequent percept
not its content (evidence accumulation). More formally, an
ANOVA of the differences across activity at time points 0 and
1.5 s showed a main effect of accuracy, correct vs. incorrect
(p,.022, consistent with predictive coding), but no main effect of
percept, coherent vs. incoherent (predicted by accumulation). In
post-hoc t-tests, pre-stimulus activity in subsequent hit-trials
was significantly greater than misses; and activity in false alarms
were significantly less than in correct rejects (p=.048 and p=.031,
respectively, unpaired one-sided t-tests; on a qualitative level,
‘‘hit.miss’’ in 8/9 subjects and ‘‘correct rejection.false alarm’’ in
6/9). The use of one-sided post-hoc t-tests was justified by the
directed assumptions of the two models that we considered;
accumulation vs. prediction. It should be pointed out that these
effects were not significant when just testing activity in a single
epoch (0 or 1.5 s) as in our previous analyses of hits and misses
alone. This observation indicates a loss of statistical power
relative to previous analyses that included a greater number of
subjects [12].
To determine the topographic specificity of the observed effects,
we analyzed BOLD time courses in a set of control regions that
were robustly activated or deactivated by the motion task. These
regions included areas involved in early visual motion processing
(V1/V2), as well as attention and perceptual decision making
(right IPL, right and left FEF, right IFG, and ACC). No region
showed the ‘‘hit.miss’’ or ‘‘correct rejection.false alarm’’ effects
in the pre-stimulus baseline, and subsequent voxel-based whole
brain analyses were also negative.
In the second experiment, we studied detection of auditory
signals presented at threshold against ongoing scanner noise [13].
This detection paradigm can be reconciled with the form of the
previous experiment by regarding it as a continuous discrimina-
tion, with two alternatives of stimulus ‘present’ or ‘absent’.
However, this free-response paradigm does not furnish correct
rejection trials (i.e., subjects are not required to indicate the
stimulus is absent). We expected the difference between hits and
false alarms to be even more pronounced than in the first
experiment. This is because in the auditory fMRI experiment
ongoing sensory noise levels were higher due to scanner noise than
in the visual experiment, where inter-stimulus intervals contained
a stationary dot pattern. Under predictive coding, this higher
sensory noise should suppress the gain of error units and reduce
activity levels, accentuating the effect of endogenous fluctuations.
As before, the predictions of the two theoretical accounts differ:
Evidence accumulation would expect hits and false alarms (i.e., an
auditory percept) to follow higher baseline levels, relative to misses
(no percept). Conversely, the predictive coding account suggests
that (incorrect) misses and false alarms are foreshadowed by
significantly lower activity than (correct) hits. Our findings in this
experiment supported the latter prediction (Fig. 2). False inference
(false alarms - red solid lines, and misses - blue dashed lines) were
preceded by significantly lower levels of activity in auditory cortex
than veridical hits (red dashed line, p=.021 and p=.018,
respectively, in unpaired one-sided t-tests; on a qualitative level,
‘‘hit.miss’’ in 7/9 subjects and ‘‘hit.false alarm’’ in 7/9). There
was no significant difference in activity preceding misses vs. false
alarms. This low activity prior to false alarms is consistent with a
scheme that under-weights sensory evidence via an inhibition of
error units and thus fails to constrain top-down predictions. The
profound activity dip in the 3 s preceding a false alarm could
indicate a critical level of ongoing activity that is necessary for the
endogenous generation of a percept, in the absence of the stimulus.
Conversely, in the case of misses, it is the dwindling of a prediction
(or the toggling to the alternative prediction) and the associated
Figure 1. Peristimulus fMRI signal time-courses from the visual
motion experiment. Data were normalized to grand mean and
averaged across 9 subjects (bars represent standard error of the mean)
performing a motion coherence judgment task. The insert specifies the
conditions as a function of stimulus and percept. The inflated right
hemisphere rendering of the group result shows the right hMT+ region
of interest, which was identified subject by subject in a localizer
procedure employing coherent motion stimuli vs. static displays. The
grey ellipse covers the pre-stimulus period submitted to statistical
testing (see main text).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009926.g001
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self-inhibition down-regulates the local fMRI signal such that
despite sensory input no percept is reported.
Incontrast to ourlocalfindingsinthemotion experiment,the pre-
stimulus effects in the auditory experiment appeared to be much less
spatially confined. Similar to the original publication–where we
report distributed ‘‘hit.miss’’ and ‘‘miss.hit’’ effects -, maps (at
t=0s) of ‘‘hit.false alarm’’ show a number of regions outside of
auditory cortex, including mid-cingulate cortex, polar and ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex and early visual cortex (cluster-level
p,0.05, corrected, after auxiliary p,0.005, uncorrected). The
reverse contrast ‘‘false alarm.hit’’ yielded no significant foci
(p,0.05, uncorrected). Note that such a difference between the
experiments was to be expected because the auditory paradigm
involved detection of near-threshold stimuli ina free-response setting
instead of two-alternative forced choice decisions on ambiguous but
clearly notable stimulation in the motion experiment.
In both experiments, we found no relationship between the
duration of the prior SOA and behavioural outcome. In the motion
experiment, the SOAs were 29.260.8 s for hits, 30.360.9 s for
misses, 29.661.3 s for correct rejections, and 30.163.2 s for false
alarms (mean 6 sd). In the auditory experiment, the SOAs were
30.660.2 s for hits, and 30.460.4 s for misses. False alarms
occurred 17.861.1 s after the preceding stimulus, i.e. approximate-
ly in the middle between two auditory stimuli.
Discussion
Both experiments support an interpretation of neural activity
(indexed by fMRI signal) in specialized sensory cortical regions as
coding prediction error and not evidence or log-probability (cf.
classical signal detection theory). Our analyses were conducted
using the responses of brain regions that are specialised for the
sensory information required for the subjects’ perceptual decisions.
Our findings therefore cannot be compared with those obtained in
higher order (polymodal) cortex like the lateral intra-parietal and
premotor areas. However, our findings can be compared to studies
of sensory cortex, where baseline variations were removed [7].
In terms of neuronal computation, the free-energy principle
encompasses evidence accumulation schemes as a special case that
is manifest at higher levels in the sensory hierarchies, as prediction
error is accumulated to optimise high-level representations and the
ensuing top-down predictions of sensory input [15]. The evidence
we present here in favour of the free-energy principle comes from
sensory regions and from the analysis of perceptual outcome as a
function of activity prior to stimulation. Our analysis was
constrained to pre-stimulus windows, because this avoids the
confounding effect of evoked signal changes (e.g., differences in
sensory stimulus properties and their frequency as well as their
perception and behavioural consequences). Yet, the same principle
is likely to hold throughout the entire time series of neural activity.
For instance, the evoked responses in the first experiment show a
main effect of stimulus type with greater responses to incoherent
motion stimuli. Again, this argues against a coding of sensory
evidence and in favour of a coding of the greater ‘‘surprise’’
associated with the less frequent incoherent motion stimuli,
compared to the more frequent periliminal coherent motion
stimuli. It is also obvious from our findings that widely applied
analysis features such as baseline normalisation to pre-stimulus
signal may distort effects observed in the evoked responses.
Our study departs from usual treatments of neuroimaging
results in terms of predictive coding [16] because we did not look
for the correlates of prediction error; we tried to disambiguate
between evidence accumulation and predictive coding schemes.
This means we had to dissociate the effects of precision and
prediction error per se (which are conflated during the expression of
precision-weighted prediction error). We therefore focussed on
pre-stimulus activity levels, which can only reflect putative changes
in the precision that is conferred on prediction errors, when they
are later induced by a stimulus.
An important limitation of our analyses is that functional
neuroimaging, while useful in recording population synaptic activity,
does not resolve the fast dynamics underpinning perceptual decisions.
This limitation is tempered by previous functional neuroimaging
studies, where fluctuations in ongoing activity can predict subsequent
percepts on a trial by trial basis [11,12,13]. In other words, we can
exploit fluctuations in neuronal activity and subsequent perceptual
processing to establish causal relationships through temporal
precedence, even with slow hemodynamic signals. As in previous
studies, we analysed time segments of the signal that are as close to the
upcoming stimulus as possible without including stimulus-driven
responses We refer to the peri-stimulus fMRI responses until stimulus
onset as ‘pre-stimulus’. However, because the hemodynamic response
delays and disperses underlying neuronal activity, some ‘pre-stimulus’
neuronal activity will actually appear after stimulus onset in the fMRI
time-series. Happily, the converse situation (post-stimulus neuronal
activity confounding pre-stimulus fMRI data) cannot occur. We
suppose that the fluctuations in baseline activity we recorded with
fMRI reflect endogenous (ongoing) fluctuations in fast neuronal
activity. Indeed, computational studies suggest that fast synchronised
activity fluctuates in power with the characteristic ultra-slow
frequencies seen in fMRI [17]. Furthermore, the general picture
from combined EEG and fMRI studies [18] suggests that increases in
fast oscillatory activity elevate BOLD signals. These slow modulations
Figure 2. Peristimulus fMRI signal time-courses from the
auditory experiment. Data were estimated under a finite response
model and averaged across 9 subjects (bars represent standard error of
the mean) performing an auditory stimulus detection task. Data are
plottedforconditionsspecifiedbyaninsert.Theinflatedrighthemisphere
rendering of the group result shows the location of the region of interest,
which includes early auditory cortex with parts of Heschl’s gyrus
(identified bilaterally subject by subject). The grey ellipse covers the
pre-stimulus period submitted to statistical testing (see main text).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009926.g002
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at a synaptic level. These effects underlie changes in post-synaptic gain
of the sort associated with attention [19] and perceptual precision (i.e.,
signal to noise) [20].
Our findings illustrate that pre-stimulus fMRI signals cannot be
interpreted as encoding sensory evidence but are consistent with
an alternative explanation that it reflects the level of attention.
Indeed, attention modulates cortical activity in sensory areas even
in the absence of input [21]. This interpretation is not at odds with
an account grounded in the free-energy principle, because the
increased precision that may be reflected in higher levels of
endogenous activity is thought to mediate the effects of directed
attention [15]. This means that the optimization of precision in
predictive coding and attention become the same thing. Whether
this necessarily applies to our observations is a complicated issue.
An effect of fluctuations on directed (endogenous) attention should
fulfil more criteria than mere modulation of local signal in a
sensory area. Among these are associated effects in higher order
attentional control centres, increased sensory response amplitudes
and shortened reaction times. No such evidence was found in our
first experiment [12] and only partial support in the second
experiment, where attention and awareness are not easily
dissociated in response amplitudes and where reaction times are
only available for hits [13]. Conversely, the insufficient evidence
for an attention account does not invalidate the interpretation
along the lines of the more general free-energy principle. In short,
whatever the neural or cognitive origin of endogenous fluctuations,
their impact on perceptual performance is captured by predictive
coding models. This is an important conclusion because the
functional role of such ongoing or endogenous activity fluctua-
tions, which have traditionally been neglected in many neuro-
physiological and theoretical investigations of perceptual inference
and decisions, is becoming increasingly evident [22,23,24,25].
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
Both studies received ethics committee approval by the
authorities responsible for our institution (INSERM-CEA, Neu-
roSpin). All subjects gave written informed consent.
Data acquisition and pre-processing
Details of both experiments have been published previously
[12,13]. Imaging data for both studies were acquired on a 3T MRI
scanner (Tim Trio, Siemens, Erlangen). Functional imaging used a
T2*-weighted gradient-echo, echo-planar imaging sequence (25
slices, TR=1500 ms, TE=30 ms, FOV 192, voxel size
36363 mm, inter-slice gap 20%). Anatomical imaging used a
T1-weighted MPRAGE sequence (160 slices, TR=2300 ms,
TE=2.98 ms, FOV 256, voxel size 1.061.061.1 mm for the
motion experiment, and 176 slices, TR=2300 ms, TE=4.18 ms,
FOV 256, voxel size 16161 mm for the auditory experiment). We
used SPM5 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk, Wellcome Trust Centre
for Neuroimaging, London, UK) for image pre-processing that
involved realignment, coregistration, normalization to MNI
stereotactic space, spatial smoothing with an isotropic Gaussian
kernel of 6 and 12 mm (motion experiment) or 5 and 6 mm
(auditory experiment) full-width-half-maximum for single subject
and group analyses, respectively and estimation of general linear
models.
Motion experiment
Twelve right-handed subjects with normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity (6 female, ages 19–30) participated in the
motion experiment. Stimuli were dynamic dot displays of 500
white squares (size 0.2u) randomly distributed on a dark grey
annulus (23u). Subjects were instructed to maintain gaze within a
central blue rectangle (1u) surrounded by a light grey circular
patch (3u) throughout the experimental sessions. For 355 ms
intervals, stimuli moved up- or downwards, at 14u/s and with
variable motion coherence. Subjects were asked to report as
quickly and accurately as possible by button presses after each
stimulus whether they had perceived coherent or random motion.
Prior to scanning we determined individual motion coherence
thresholds based on the method of constant stimuli (average
motion coherence threshold across subjects 13%, range 8 to 20%).
During fMRI scanning, three motion coherence levels were used:
subliminal (1% coherence, 20 trials), periliminal (individual
threshold, 60 trials), and supraliminal (30% coherence, 20 trials).
Stimuli were presented in two 25 minute runs with 50 trials each.
Between stimuli, the display was static for inter-stimulus intervals
(ISI) of 20 to 40 s that were randomly selected from a uniform
distribution.
Functional images for two 1000 volume experimental runs and
one 208 volume localizer run were acquired. Localizer fMRI runs
identified cortical regions sensitive to two types of coherent visual
motion, up- or downwards motion and an expanding ‘starfield’.
Continuous 16 s motion blocks were separated by 10 s stationary
periods, and each condition was repeated over 6 blocks in counter-
balanced order. Motion-sensitive areas were identified by mapping
for each subject the contrast ‘motion . stationary’ at p,0.001,
uncorrected. A local maximum near the ascending limb of the
inferior temporal sulcus was defined as hMT+ (see original
publication for coordinates). After removing session effects and
linear trends from the BOLD signal time series of the main
experiment, we extracted the percent signal change time courses of
all periliminal and subliminal trials from 4 scans (6 s) before to 12
scans (18 s) after target onset and sorted them according to hits
(perceiving periliminal stimuli as coherent), misses (periliminal
stimuli as random), correct rejections (subliminal stimuli as
random), and false alarms (subliminal stimuli as coherent). Here,
we only report data from those subjects who generated a sufficient
number of false alarms (n=9 out of 12 subjects). Across subjects,
near-threshold stimuli generated 57% hits and 43% misses, and
subliminal stimuli 74% correct rejects and 26% false alarms.
Auditory experiment
Twelve right-handed normal hearing subjects (2 female; ages
19–30) participated in the auditory experiment. One subject
reported to have fallen asleep in one session and was thus excluded
from analysis. Subjects were exposed to sparse near-threshold
auditory stimuli and performed an auditory detection task. The
stimulus was a 500 ms noise burst with its frequency band
modulated at 2 Hz (from white noise to a narrower band of 0–
5 kHz and back to white noise). Subjects were blindfolded and
instructed to report as quickly and accurately as possible by a right
hand key press whenever they heard the target sound despite
scanner’s background noise. In a first 6.5 min fMRI run, which
was not analyzed, we determined each subject’s auditory threshold
using a simple staircase procedure with 25 trials and inter-stimulus
intervals randomized between 2.5 and 5 s. Next, each subject
performed 2 and some subjects 3 experimental runs of 20 min
duration. In each run, target stimuli were presented at individual
threshold (periliminal stimuli) on 36 trials and at a fixed supra-
threshold level on 4 ‘catch’ trials. ISIs ranged unpredictably from
20 to 40 s, with each specific ISI used only once. Before each run,
the target stimulus was played a few times at supra-threshold
volume for (re)memorization and subjects were informed that in
Neuronal Fluctuations
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perceptible level. If within 1.5 s of stimulus onset a key was pressed
this trial was counted as a hit, if not as a miss. All other key presses
were classified as false alarms. Here, we restricted our analysis to
those subjects who generated at least 5 false alarms (n=9 out of
11). These subjects detected 59617% of the near-threshold
stimuli.
Experimental runs consisted of 820 volumes. An additional
passive localizer run for defining auditory responsive brain regions
was acquired after the main experiment. This 81 volume run
consisted of three 20 s-blocks of repetitive stimulus presentation
with 0.5 s inter-stimulus intervals (ISI) at clearly audible volume
separated by 15 s baseline epochs. Voxels responding to the
auditory stimulus were defined on a subject-by subject basis in two
steps. First, at the group level the contrast periliminal stimuli (i.e.
hits and misses) . baseline (p,0.001) was masked by the passive
auditory localizer contrast at p,0.001. A spherical search space of
10 mm was defined around the peak of the peri-Heschl clusters
with the highest z-score. Next, for each subject’s corresponding
first-level contrast all voxels within this search space were selected
that passed a lenient threshold (p,0.05, uncorrected).
As false alarms occurred at unpredictable times and sometimes
prior to hemodynamic relaxation, we could not directly analyze
fMRI signal time courses as in the motion experiment. We hence
used a finite impulse response (FIR) model on the high-pass
filtered data with very low cutoff (1/1000 Hz) and no pre-
whitening to ensure linear drift removal while minimizing
interference with low frequency brain activity fluctuations. The
FIR model used 24 peristimulus stick functions (x 1.5 s bins) for
each of the four conditions, hits, misses, false alarms and catch
trials. For near-threshold stimuli (hits and misses) time-locking was
based on stimulus presentation; for false alarms it was based on
behavioural reports minus the subject’s average reaction time in
hit trials (7946109 ms).
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: GH SS AK. Performed the
experiments: GH SS. Analyzed the data: GH SS. Wrote the paper: GH SS
KJF AK.
References
1. Kersten D, Mamassian P, Yuille A (2004) Object perception as Bayesian
inference. Annu Rev Psychol 55: 271–304.
2. Gold JI, Shadlen MN (2007) The neural basis of decision making. Annu Rev
Neurosci 30: 535–574.
3. Heekeren HR, Marrett S, Ungerleider LG (2008) The neural systems that
mediate human perceptual decision making. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 9:
467–479.
4. Smith PL, Ratcliff R (2004) Psychology and neurobiology of simple decisions.
Trends in Neurosciences 27: 161–168.
5. Friston KJ (2005) A theory of cortical responses. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol
Sci 360: 815–836.
6. Rao RPN, Ballard DH (1999) Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a functional
interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects. Nat Neurosci 2:
79–87.
7. Ress D, Heeger DJ (2003) Neuronal correlates of perception in early visual
cortex. Nat Neurosci 6: 414–420.
8. Murray SO, Kersten D, Olshausen BA, Schrater P, Woods DL (2002) Shape
perception reduces activity in human primary visual cortex. Proc Natl Acad Sci
USA 99: 15164–15169.
9. Kleinschmidt A, Bu ¨chel C, Hutton C, Friston KJ, Frackowiak RS (2002) The
neural structures expressing perceptual hysteresis in visual letter recognition.
Neuron 34: 659–666.
10. Boly M, Balteau E, Schnakers C, Degueldre C, Moonen G, et al. (2007) Baseline
brain activity fluctuations predict somatosensory perception in humans. Proc
Natl Acad Sci USA 104: 12187–12192.
11. Hesselmann G, Kell CA, Eger E, Kleinschmidt A (2008) Spontaneous local
variations in ongoing neural activity bias perceptual decisions. PNAS 105:
10984–10989.
12. Hesselmann G, Kell CA, Kleinschmidt A (2008) Ongoing activity fluctuations in
hMT+ bias the perception of coherent visual motion. Journal of Neuroscience
28: 14481–14485.
13. Sadaghiani S, Hesselmann G, Kleinschmidt A (2009) Distributed and
antagonistic contributions of ongoing activity fluctuations to auditory stimulus
detection. Journal of Neuroscience 29: 13410–13417.
14. Friston K (2008) Hierarchical models in the brain. PLOS Comput Biol 4:
e1000211.
15. Friston K (2009) The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain? Trends
Cogn Sci 13: 293–301.
16. Summerfield C, Egner T, Greene M, Koechlin E, Mangels J, et al. (2006)
Predictive codes for forthcoming perception in the frontal cortex. Science 314:
1311–1314.
17. Deco G, Jirsa V, McIntosh AR, Sporns O, Koetter R (2009) Key role of
coupling, delay, and noise in resting brain fluctuations. PNAS 106:
10302–10307.
18. Laufs H (2008) Endogenous brain oscillations and related networks detected by
surface EEG-combined fMRI. Human Brain Mapping 29: 762–769.
19. Schroeder CE, Mehta AD, Foxe JJ (2001) Determinants and mechanisms of
attentional modulation of neural processing. Frontiers in Bioscience 6:
d672–684.
20. Kroener S, Chandler LJ, Philipps PE, Seamans JK (2009) Dopamine modulates
persistent synaptic activity and enhances the signal-to-noise ratio in the
prefrontal cortex. PLOS One 4: e6507.
21. Kastner S, Pinsk MA, De Weerd P, Desimone R, Ungerleider LG (1999)
Increased activity in human visual cortex during directed attention in the
absence of visual stimulation. Neuron 22: 751–761.
22. Fox MD, Raichle ME (2007) Spontaneous fluctuations in brain activity observed
with functional magnetic resonance imaging. Nat Rev Neurosci 8: 700–711.
23. Deco G, Romo R (2008) The role of fluctuations in perception. Trends in
Neurosciences 31: 591–598.
24. Fox MD, Snyder AZ, Vincent JL, Raichle ME (2007) Intrinsic fluctuations
within cortical systems account for intertrial variability in human behavior.
Neuron 56: 171–184.
25. Fox MD, Snyder AZ, Zacks JM, Raichle ME (2006) Coherent spontaneous
activity accounts for trial-to-trial variability in human evoked brain responses.
Nature Neuroscience 9: 23–25.
Neuronal Fluctuations
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 March 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 3 | e9926